Introduction
In the tumultuous aftermaths of the Arab Spring, the only country which appears to have engaged a process of democratization is precisely where everything started:
Tunisia. However, several political, social and security challenges threaten the process (Hmed 2016) . Tunisia has particularly stood out as the first sender of foreign fighters to the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, puzzling observers (Malka and Balboni 2016: Watanabe and Merz 2017) .
Drawing on the findings of the African Barometer highlighting that the perceptions of extremist threats were the highest in Tunisia and Egypt (Bentley, Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke 2016) , this analysis seeks to add to these quantitative findings a qualitative perspective to better characterize the perceptions of these threats, namely, the reasons perceived behind radicalization and the best way to address them. Some of them took place face-to-face and others by Skype. In terms of situatedness, and in order to enhance the precision of data collection, interviews were individually conducted in the Tunisian dialect and thus, in a conversational style. Civil society organizations were first used as an entry point: people active in institutionalized civil society organizations were approached and accounted for judgment sampling due to their exposure and subsequent knowledge of the post-transitional stage. In a second stage, a combination of snowball and opportunities sampling allowed access to young people, mostly students in order to broaden the consideration to "grassroots", and not simply, to civil society organizations.
As highlighted by Bentley, Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke, surveying grassroots perspectives can add "community-level perceptions that could be useful as counterextremism policies are developed and refined" (Bentley, Lekalake and BuchananClarke 2016, 1) . In fact, grassroots' perspectives of the level of terrorist threat do not necessarily match the objective events: Bentley, Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke note that:
Tunisia experienced far fewer terror attacks in 2014 (23) than Egypt (346) and Sudan (157), yet Tunisians were more likely to view ISIL and AQIM as a threat than were Egyptians and Sudanese. Higher levels of perceived threat in Tunisia may reflect factors that are not captured in Global Terrorism Data, such as local intimidation through forced recruitment, kidnappings, and the return of foreign fighters. Citizen perceptions, in this case , can be useful for a fuller understanding of the security situation, which may not be readily assessable through incident data alone (Bentley, Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke 2016, 6 ).
This article has two sections. As one of the actors understood as part of the grassroots is civil society, the first section retraces the background of the Tunisian transitional context because it directly has an impact on civil society and the roles it can adopt in a post-revolutionary context. The second section gives an overview on the global issue of foreign terrorist fighters, its local characteristics for the case of Tunisia, the motivations usually advanced in the literature and the challenges implied by their return, while putting forward what is considered here as grassroots perspectives, namely, the voices of civil society activists, students and young Tunisians interviewed for this article on two essential elements: the motives perceived behind radicalization and the appeal of the so-called Islamic State as well as the means to counter-extremist narratives.
Tunisian Civil Society in Transition

From Revolution to Transition
Mohammed Bouazizi, a young street vendor set himself on fire on 17 December 2010 after being denied a vendor permit by local authorities. This unleashed several popular protests starting first in Sidi Bouzid before spreading to the country and to the region, a revolutionary wave known as the Arab Spring. While Ben Ali promised to crush demonstrations, the Chief of the Tunisian Armed Forces, Rachid Ammar assured that the Army would not shoot unarmed protesters. On 14 January 2011, Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi announced an interim government, following the escape of the former President Ben Ali to Saudi Arabia, putting an end to twenty-three years of autocratic rule. Fouad Mebazaa, the President of the Assembly, became president and replaced Mohammed Ghannouchi with Béji Caid Essebsi after several protests against former collaborators of Ben Ali. Elections were held in October 2011 in order to establish a National Constituent Assembly charged with drafting and adopting a new constitution. Enhadha clearly stood out as a contender, benefiting from an aura of early opponent to Ben Ali's regime (Fortier 2015) . The outcome of the elections in October 2011 lead to the formation of a coalition government with two other secular parties, the Rally for the Republic Party (CPR) and Ettakatol party, forcing compromise (Zisenwine 2016) . Moncef Marzouki, leader of the CPR, was elected interim President by the Assembly in December 2011. However, the grace period quickly ended as the party quickly seemed overwhelmed by mounting economic and social challenges and rising expectations, while Islamists were being equally contested in Egypt (Zisenwine 2016 ). On 24 January 2014, in a historical moment, the Constituent Assembly finally adopted the new Constitution. The constitutional process was probably the best illustration of the degree of inclusiveness of civil society (Ajala, Paffenholz et al. 2013 : Fortier 2015 . Despite delays, the process successfully relied on commissions representing the different political sensitivities and regular meetings with citizens in the different wilayas, and abroad with the diaspora. The constitution reflects a delicate balance between the Muslim, Arab and African identities of the country and bears the mark of the Tunisian School of Reformed Muslim Thought represented by Tahar Ben Achour (Laabidi 2014) . However, and in order to gather a maximum of support, the constitution necessarily suffers from a part of vagueness and risky compromises (Kelly 2014). Serious challenges continue to lie ahead regarding its implementation, including the necessity to engage more actively civil society (Laabidi 2014) . There has been mounting social contestation, especially from internal regions, aggravated by a lack of trust in political leadership and resulting into a "trend for rioting" (Kerrou 2017) .
Civil Society in Transition
Transitions are understood here as long-term complex societal processes of change involving different dimensions of transitions from authoritarian to more participatory forms of governance often accompanied by violence (Schmitter and O'Donnell 1986) . Change is not as a linear process as it is characterized by regression, stagnation and/or the existence of hybrid forms of governance and societal arrangements where different phases of transition can take place in parallel. Transitions imply complex social, political and economic transformations on a long term. These transformations entail instability and can be prone to violence and/or state fragility. This section aims at defining civil society and its roles in the Tunisian transition not only because civil society organizations are used as part of the grassroots but also because the transition allows for changes in the political opportunity structure that can facilitate radicalization as we shall see. It is thus necessary to account for the potential role of civil society in disrupting this process facilitating radicalization before considering the issue of terrorist fighters.
Civil society is comprised out of a set of diverse actors from professional associations, faith-based organizations, professional service delivery or human rights advocacy NGOs as well as traditional groupings or youth clubs that can take up various roles in different phases and sub-phases of transition. Any comprehensive attempt to understand the role of civil society in transitions needs to address the heterogeneous notion, different discourses and practices of the concept in various historical and geographical contexts as well as in different academic traditions (Paffenholz 2010) .
Concerning civil society in the Middle East and North Africa before the Arab Spring, the literature generally emphasized the weakness of civil society to counter strong and authoritarian regimes (Sadowski 1993, 15) . Nevertheless, Norton had already noted a gradual opening of political space under some authoritarian states due to increasing pressure from citizens (Norton 1995, 4-8) . Vallianotes similarly argues that a grassroots movement was actually in the making in the years preceding the "Arab Spring" (Vallianatos 2013, 6) .
Civil society adopts different roles in the different subphases of transitions or the liberalisation, institutionalisation and consolidation phases (Schmitter and O'Donnell 1986 ). Paffenholz and Spurk suggest a model based on seven functions (protection, monitoring, advocacy, socialisation, social cohesion, facilitation, service delivery) as part of a comprehensive framework for the analysis of civil society in transitions (Paffenholz and Spurk 2010) . Civil society actors perform a variety of social and political functions with specific impacts on distinct subphases of transitions.
Additionally, the impact of these functions is strongly influenced by the context in which these different civil society actors are operating. Civil society facilitates democratic consolidation processes by adopting different roles: agenda-setter, civic education of the people, a source for alternative constellations of power (Behr & Sittonen 2013, 9) . The possibility of civil society acting in these roles depends on the level of repression, pluralism and the mode of transition (Behr & Sittonen 2013, 9) .
According to Behr and Sittonen, "the Arab Spring revolutions provided a sudden boost to civil society activism across the Middle East" (Behr & Sittonen 2013, 14) . The Arab Spring saw the emergence of "a new model for the genre: no leader, no ideological program and no organized popular bases, rather, an accumulated popular demand for change" (Sakbani 2011, 144) . They were characterized by their unexpectedness, their spontaneity, lack of leadership and organization (Volpi, 2012 , 3: Weyland 2012 . They also revealed the inefficiency of traditional tools of mobilization in the authoritarian contexts of the region. Young Arabs took the streets disregarding the "traditional ineffective civic forms of organizing such as political parties and the so-called non-governmental organizations" (Ziad Abdel Samad, quoted in Halaseh 2013, 258) . The challenges faced by civil society organizations undermined their credibility as legitimate representatives so young educated Arabs acted on their own. The number of civil society groups quickly increased in the aftermath of the Revolution in Tunisia (Fortier 2015) . However, after the enthusiasm of the revolutionary period, it was very difficult for activists to maintain the momentum especially in the context of growing divisions (Weyland 2012, 924) , the first one being the divide between religious and secular forces (Behr & Sittonen 2013, 10) . This big line of division between Secular and Islamist constellations should not blind us from the deep internal divisions within each side. The strong divisions between liberal groups are in fact well documented (Aliboni 2011, 8) . The Arab Spring also has had effects on Islamism as it showed the heterogeneity of the Islamist scene, the use of Islamist informal networks especially with social media, the change in discourse (less focused on the religious state than on good governance) and the emergence of new clashes within this sphere (Al-Anani 2012; Roy 2012).
Despite that, the Tunisian civil society was able to act as a vocal agenda-setter (Behr 2013, 10) . This was strongly confirmed by one interviewee, Riadh, a project manager in an association for civic education training Twitter for instance is a major tool for disseminators (Klausen 2015) . Profiles are developed to share updates and a range of hashtags are mobilized to share media content and serve propaganda. Facebook accounts give the possibility to share all the aspects of the jihadi life in Syria. Even humor and the codes of geek and pop culture are used in the process, in order to normalize the status of these fighters and thus attract even more potential candidates, as the tech-savvy generation is the main target of Daesh (Atwan 2015, 20) .
Estimates by the Soufan Group, the United Nations or the International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation all place Tunisia as the top exporter of foreign fighters (Sayah 2017; Watanabe and Merz 2017) . The instability of the post-revolutionary phase implies a highly contested political opportunity structure, occasionally contracting but also expanding spaces for a renewed political expression (Fortier 2015) .
The spaces of free expression that opened up after the revolution were quickly and successfully occupied by the Salafi discourse which grew after the uprisings, especially for da'wa 3 and encouragement to jihad against Bachar al-Assad ( From a prescriptive aspect, these observations give credit to Fahmi and Meddeb's recommendation to the government on the need to encourage imams to "compete with Salafi preachers to create a diverse marketplace of religious ideas" (Fahmi & Meddeb 2015) . Riadh also ended his explanation by stating that the Oulema and the Ministry of Religious Affairs had an important role to play in countering these radicalizing processes.
Conclusion
The motivations of foreign fighters can be quite heterogeneous, contributing to the demise of any typical profile of candidate to jihad. In the case of Tunisia, the volatile democratization process which also raised high and unmet expectations is the extent to which interviewees tended to direct the discussion towards ideological issues rather than limit it to an issue of deprivation. Indeed, though the interviewees agreed on the speed of radicalization and the role of economic and social grievances as factors motivating to jihad, all of them quickly added that the economic and social perspectives are insufficient to fully comprehend the motivations of young fighters and that the ideological aspect is crucial. Consequently, they insisted, from a counterextremist perspective, on the concept of Wasatiyyyah and the need to direct efforts towards reconceptualising religions education and education in general.
The introduction of this article referred to Bentley, Lekalake and BuchananClarke observation that surveying grassroots perspectives can add "community-level perceptions that could be useful as counter-extremism policies are developed and refined" (Bentley, Lekalake and Buchanan-Clarke 2016, 1) , especially as hybrid strategies including for instance deradicalization initiatives are being experienced or developed in states faced with the issue of returnees. At a time where Tunisian authorities have tended to rely primarily on repressive measures (Watanabe and Merz 2017, 141) , the insistence on education in general and religious education as well as the need to ground them in the Tunisian "Wasatiyyah" provide valuable insights for counter-extremism and counterterrorism.
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